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Preface
The recent election results in Natal must have come as a nasty
surprise to commentators that reduce ethnic mobilization to
manipulation or political patronage. Clearly, the electorate
rejected Mare's conclusion in Brothers Born of Warrior Blood
that:
"The way in which a political version of the 'Zulu nation'
has been created supports the argument that ethnicity
should not be politically privileged."1
Mare argues that, in contrast to ethnic mobilisation, african
nationalism unites people around their true and legitimate common
interests. As far as Mare is concerned the rhetoric of ethnic
nationalism only serves to obscure the real issues, and
legitimate an oppressive status quo. No attempt is made by Mare
to relate the rhetoric of ethnic mobilization to pre-colonial
sources of political authority (particularly chiefly, gendered
and generational authority) or to do research to find out what
the rhetoric of ethnic nationalism actually means to Inkatha's
supporters.
The Pulana are an ethnic group located in the Bushbuckridge
district of the North Eastern Transvaal. Striking similarities
exist in the rhetoric used to mobilise Zulu nationalist and
Pulana nationalist movements. This rhetoric links ethnic
nationalism to the politics of the chieftainship, particularly
when expressing claims to land and political authority. Yet,
while Zulu nationalism had, at best, a strained relationship with
African nationalist movements, a substantial overlap existed in
the interests of Pulana nationalists and their African
nationalist counterparts.
This paper, a chapter from my thesis, examines the relationship
between african nationalism, ethnic nationalism and chiefly
politics as these variables played themselves out in the career
of Matsiketsane Mashile, a Pulana leader. In doing so, it
attempts to offer a more nuanced and complex approach towards
understanding the relationship between democracy, the politics
of the chieftainship, and ethnic mobilization.
Introduction
Matsiketsane Mashile had scars on his back (from lashings he
received as part of a sentence for incitement), a broken
cheekbone (from a farmer who tried to prevent him from collecting
the belongings of a deceased worker), and a voice that could make
his audience "soar through the clouds"2 (a gift from his
ancestors). Matsiketsane was an African National Congress leader
and unrecognised chief banished in 1963 for fifteen years
because of his opposition to Tribal Authorities. He returned to
Bushbuckridge in 1978 and immediately set about rebuilding his
chieftainship. He demonstrated his spiritual prowess in his
position as a Bishop in the Bantu Apostolic Faith Mission Church
and as a faith healer. He constituted a family council (Bagomana)
and then built a core following by organising the largest burial
society in Bushbuckridge. As an elected Member of Lebowa
Parliament, Mashile fought corruption in the Lebowa Government,
and in doing so, became a political representative of the
population, a position supposedly reserved for recognised chiefs.
As an unrecognised "chief", based in a Pulana "island" allocated
to Gazankulu, who forged links with the African National Congress
in the fifties, Mashile personified the gap between the Pulana
(oral) history of the district and the perceptions and policies
of the bureaucracy. Building on his singular history,
Matsiketsane was able to forge alliances with the two
oppositional movements that emerged amongst the Pulana. The first
movement, the Pulana nationalists, grounded their opposition to
Apartheid on a moral economy of the chieftainship that drew on
the imaginary of the chief as living representative of the
dominant lineage. Building on this moral economy, that
nationalists constructed a series of principles that constituted
what they considered to be the appropriate relationship between
ethnicity and politics. These principles clashed with those
employed by the Apartheid state, especially those principles
applied by the state in the allocation of land. Organisationally,
this movement took the form of a migrant association, the Leihlo
La Naga: the Eye of the Nation. The second oppositional movement,
the secular Pulana, grounded their critique of Apartheid on their
racial identity, that is their exclusion from central state power
because of their racial characteristics. Although these residents
acknowledged their ethnic identity, their political focus was
distinctly national. They recognised the counter hegemonic
potential of the Pulana identity, but did not organise
politically around ethnicity. Hence, although they saw the
practice of initiation school, the employment of indigenous
idioms, and the use of the Pulana language as part of a process
of resisting colonial intrusions, they steadfastly refused to
link the wielding of political power to ethnicity. The secular
Pulana drew on democratic principles which dictated that all
subjects be treated as equals by the state and which seperated
the wielding of social authority from any spiritual dimension.
These people formed the Mapulaneng Crisis Committee (MCC) and
aligned themselves with national political organisations linked
to the Congress tradition.
Although the two movements shared large areas of overlapping
interest, the two approaches were not entirely compatible. The
secular Pulana, who brought national political organisation to
the district, were interested in building organisations (both
adult and youth) with the capacity to challenge the bureaucracy.
Mashile's role as a Member of Parliament was crucial in achieving
t.li'.s goal. However, Mashile's claim to traditional authority
was a double edged sword for the Crisis Committee. On the one
hand, Mashile represented historical continuity, and as a
consequence, drew on a multitude of cultural resources that
resonated with his constituency. On the other hand, Mashile's
authority was never able to transcend the confines of chiefly
secession disputes and sectarian ethnic interests. This in turn
drew organisations with a national agenda into localised
conflicts.
This paper explores the relationship between chiefly politics and
Pulana and African nationalism as it unfolded in the career of
Matsiketsane Mashile.
Matsiketsane and the Chieftainship
Matsiketsane Mashile was born in 1927 on Maripeskop (Moholoholo),
the second son of his father's third wife. Two years after his
birth, a few hundred families were removed by the forestry
Department to five farms owned by the state some forty kilometres
east of Maripeskop on the Lowveld. The removed households settled
along the same clan lines that existed at Maripeskop. Amongst the
removed households were refugees from Mozambique known by the
Pulana as the Bahlakano, who had settled on Maripeskop under a
Pulana chief. Although there seems to have been spatial
segregation in that the Bahlakano formed a separate "clan", the
refugees spoke Pulana, and attended initiation school and the
Pulana Kgoro.3 Three years after the removal, Matsiketsane's
brother, Sekgopela Mashile was born.
Matsiketsane's claim to the chieftainship was based on his
relationship to Maripe. According to Mashile, his grand-father,
Legole Mashile, was one of Maripe's sons, who died before he
could "take over his rightful place" on the chieftainship.
Instead, Setlare took over as "acting chief" on Maripe's death.
Setlare changed his surname from Mashile to Chiloane to "distance
himself" from his brother. Mashile's father, Lekgwadi, entered
into a secession dispute with Setlare when he was old enough to
take over the chieftainship. The dispute divided the chiefdom
into two areas, one controlled by Setlare, one by Lekgwadi.
However, during the dispute, Lekgwadi was "murdered" by
witchcraft used by his opponent. A year after the death of
Lekgwadi, the forestry removals took place resulting in most of
Lekgwadi's followers being removed to the Lowveld. On Setlare's
death in 1946, Mabalane Chiloane became chief. Mabalane was
succeeded by his eldest son, Sekganyane in 1956. On the death of
Sekganyane in 1959, his brother Masinyane Chiloane ruled as
regent for four years. After Masinyane's death, another of
Sekganyane's brothers, German Chiloane, became regent. German
ruled (officially at least) till the end of the eighties.4
Although rules of genealogical seccession legitimise claims to
the chieftainship, these rules, in and of themselves, do not
determine secession. As can be noted from the above, genealogical
claims are complex. Royal blood provides a claimant with the
authority to speak, but it does not guarantee that claimant the
right to rule. When the divinely sanctioned harmony between
rulers and ruled is broken, that is, when the actions of the
chief and the aspirations of his subjects differ, secession
disputes ensured that the aspirations of the chief and that of
his subjects are made congruant. Secession disputes were the
rule, rather than the exception. Comaroff provides a succinct
summary of what this entails:
Genealogical argument may provide the terms in which rival
claims are debated, but actual outcomes depend upon the
processes of competition for support and on the ability of
politicians to mobilise followers. In this sense,
ascription and achievement are not conflicting principles
but describe two levels of one reality"5
Although the Kgoro dictated procedures which governed the
exercise of chiefly power, and the external context also placed
limits on the wielding of that power, chiefly authority was also
dependent on the personality of the chief. "His right to regulate
the affairs of the morafa [chiefdom] was held, tautologically,
to depend on his ability to demonstrate his effectiveness before
his people".6 Or as one informant put it: "the chief chooses
himself".
Bushbuckridge in the seventies and eighties, provided a
paradoxical context within which a chief could exercise power:
On the one hand, recognition meant that the chief was a
bureaucrat, forced to implement broadly unpopular policies. On
the other hand, the powers of any member of the bureaucracy were
obscure; a chief with a powerful personality was able to exploit
this confusion to consolidate his authority, while those with
less powerful personalities were marginalised by other sections
of the bureaucracy. Matsiketsane inherited a political vacuum in
the gap between popular visions of the chieftainship and the
reality of Tribal Authorities. The administrative confusion
surrounding the bureaucracy also personalised the political
process: those people with the ability to assert administrative
control effectively had control. The fulfilment of Matsiketsane's
political aspirations hinged on his ability to demonstrate his
personal powers by exploiting these vacuums.
When Matsiketsane was a child, his grand-mother told him, that
by right, he was chief. His ancestors confirmed his royal calling
by appearing to him in dreams.7 In short, Matsiketsane knew
himself to be the chief. The ball was in his court. He needed to
prove that his ancestors had endowed him with the qualities
worthy of the respect paid to a chief. In demonstrating these
powers, Mashile hoped to build a sufficient support base to
appropriate the chieftainship. The following sections show how
Matsiketsane went about achieving this end.
Urban Experiences
A year after Matsiketsane was born his father was allegedly
murdered in the course of the chieftainship dispute with Setlare.
As was the custom, Matsiketsane's mother was remarried to his
father's younger brother. Mashile had just completed his Standard
One at a local school when his "younger father" died. His
"younger father" had used most of Mashile's father's cattle to
buy more wives. Those few cattle that remained were "taken" by
Mashile's half brother, who moved to Leamington some forty
kilometres away. Mashile's family found themselves destitute.
Having achieved his Standard one, Mashile had to "cry tears of
frustration" at having to leave school,8 and he left for the
Witwatersrand to seek employment.
Mashile worked as a domestic before being employed at Amato
textiles in Benoni. He moved from the Benoni hostel to the Apex
squatter camp in order to live with his wife. The camp was
organised along a mixture of regional and ethnic lines; Pulana
and other migrants from Bushbuckridge had a section of the camp
and held a kgotla every weekend. Matsiketsane became Markus
Madiongoane's, the leader of the camp, secretary. At Amato
textiles he became a South African Council of Trade Unions
(SACTU) shop steward. In the wake of the 1955 Amato strike,
Mashile lost his job at the textile company. Two years later
Mashile returned to Mapulaneng.'
The Ludlow Mashile returned to in 1957 was a very different
place to the one he had left in 1948. The South African Native
Trust (SANT) had purchased Ludlow and were in the process of
moving residents from their scattered households into residential
blocks, and demarcating the haphazard agricultural plots into one
morgan squares. Mashile also found himself living on a "Pulana
island"; Despite the predominance of Pulanas on Ludlow, as well
as surrounding farms, the farms fell under the Shangaan "sphere
of influence" and had been allocated to the Mnisi chieftainship.
Mashile also discovered that the surrounding farms were involved
in a bitter struggle with Hall and Sons, an agricultural company
based in Nelspruit. Hall and Sons had purchased eight farms
in the immediate vicinity of Ludlow in 1944. The relationship
between the company and their tenants had been fraught. As rent
tenants, residents had fought the companies attempts to increase
rent, monopolise the sale of cattle and the use of manure, and
force their children to work at the company's farm in
Nelspruit.10 These struggles reached a climax in 1957 when the
company tried to introduce compulsory labour tenancy on the
farms. The tenants were given ninety days notice to leave the
farm or accept labour tenant conditions. When the notice period
had expired, the indunas on the farms were ordered to appear
before the Native Commissioner. Whilst visiting the Commissioner,
their homes were destroyed.11
With the expulsion of the indunas a leadership vacuum emerged and
Matsiketsane enthusiastically joined the fray. He took over the
induna's court and found an unlikely ally in a neighbouring
farmer, Nic Roberts, who was the head of the district's Labour
Tenancy Control Board. Roberts seasonally employed the tenants
on Hall and Son's property and was loath to see his supply of
labour dry up with the implementation of labour tenancy on the
company farms. He tried to use his position on the Control Board
to influence the Commissioner to ban labour tenancy in the
Released Area.12 His approach to the Commissioner was untenable
as Hall and Sons were acting in accordance with Chapter Four,
which formally abolished rent tenancy. Mashile reported the
conflict to "The World" newspaper, who wrote an article on it.13
Roberts and Mashile tried to employ lawyers to sue Hall and Sons
for damages and to withdraw the eviction notices. Before the
cases reached court, the NAD suspended the implementation of
Chapter Four in the district.
After clarifying that there was no possibility of the Company's
farms being excluded from the Released Area, Hall and Sons
dropped their attempts to implement labour tenancy.14 The
relationship between the company and the tenants did not improve,
however. Matsiketsane continued to challenge the company's
monopoly on cattle sales and their right to appropriate kraal-
manure. On one of his expeditions to Johannesburg to seek
assistance, Mashile contacted the African National Congress
(ANC). The ANC agreed to provide the tenants with legal
assistance on the condition that they joined the organisation.
Mashile convened a meeting, and about four hundred people joined
the organisation. Through the intervention of the lawyers, the
appropriation of kraal manure ceased.
Mashile used his court to run ANC meetings. "When the police came
we used to put ANC minutes under the table and take out the books
of the tribal court."15 In 1960, a spy attended his court, and
Mashile was arrested on charges of incitement for encouraging
people to burn their passes. He was found guilty and sentanced
to two years hard labour at Barberton Prison and five lashes.
Recalling the lashes, Mashile commented: "They hit me that day
until I could see stars. But I thought: "You buggers! You think
I will be afriad of you and let you take my land."1'
On his release, Mashile discovered that the farm on which he was
resident, as well as surrounding farms, were allocated to the
Mnisi Tribal Authority. With the assistance of his younger
brother, Sekgopela, Mashile began to organise resistance to the
demarcation of Tribal Authority areas. He demanded that the area
of his chieftainship be recognised or that he be given immediate
recognition as the legitimate heir to the Setlare chieftainship.
The meetings he organised were well attended and militant: "Blood
would flow", Mashile allegedly asserted, if the courts did not
rectify the situation. An exasperated Charles Bourquin, the
Native Commissioner who prided himself on his ability to "justly"
mediate between state and the "native" gave up the struggle of
trying to "reason" with the brothers, and organised that the
brothers were banished from the area to the Eastern Cape.17
Banishment
Matsiketsane spent fifteen years in the Transkei, while his
brother was restricted to the Ciskei for eleven years.
Matsiketsane was very active in exile: "My house was like a
hospital", he remembers, "People were coming from all over for
me to pray for them. I wasted a lot of time on church business.
I used to go into the mountains and fast. "ie Helen Joseph
organised bursaries for the two brothers. Matsiketsane passed his
Standard eight and two matric subjects. Sekgopela also passed his
Standard eight exams-. Lastly, Mashile worked for the Tanskei
government on an experiemental farm. Church, school and work
were, however, no substitute for home: the years in exile were
extremely painful for both brothers who were c5? •'iically
homesick.19
Although the two brother were physically absent from
Bushbuckridge, they left a heritage behind in the district which
was to grow more powerful year by year as residents of the area
began to experience the inequities of Apartheid. Residents began
to look to their past for symbols of resistance as inspiration
to guide them in their immediate struggles. The memory of the
Mashile brothers served this purpose. In many quarters,
(incorrect) stories circulated about the Mashiles being prisoners
on Robbin Island, with other national leaders. Yet the heritage
the Mashiles left behind was ambiguous: Matsiketsane's
association with the African National Congress animated people
looking to national liberation organisations for their
emancipation. On the other hand, his association with Pulana land
claims made him a symbol of (sectarian) ethnic interests. On his
return to Bushbuckridge,- Matsiketsane was to build on both
aspects of this heritage, without, however, resolving any of the
ambiguity surrounding it.
The Brothers Return to Bushbuckridge
In 1974, Sekgopela returned from the Ciskei. Perceived by the
Commissioner as a threat to public order, he was immediately
placed under house arrest. In 1978, while still formally under
arrest, he sucessfully ran for the Lebowa Legislative Assembly.
The same year Matsiketsane (illegally) returned from the
Transkei. After fasting for sixteen days in the mountains, (and
nearly dying in the process), Mashile went to go and ask the
magistrate for permission to stay permanently at Bushbuckridge.
He was banished to Bochum, but on appeal was allowed to return
to Bushbuckridge and live under house arrest for three months,
after which the restrictions were removed.20
Matsiketsane returned to find the nucleas of his chieftainship
intact. Despite the area's allocation to the Mnisi chieftainship
and to Gazankulu, Matsiketsane's nephew, Benson Mashile had
maintained the core institutions of the chieftainship. Benson
held Kgoro at his home every second weekend. He also ensured that
initiation school was held in defiance of the banning of the
institution by the Gazankulu Legislative Assembly. Benson was
also chair of the Primary and Secondary school committees. The
Mashile's following was ethnically heteroqenous and included many
of the families removed from Maripeskop.
Matsiketsane's most powerful ally was his brother, Sekgopela. The
two brother's complimented one another. If Matsiketsane was the
talker, Sekgopela was the listener. If Matsiketsane demanded
respect because of his uncompromising pugnaciousness, Sekgopela
commanded respect with his unflappable composure. Furthermore,
both brothers were extraordinarily brave people. By fighting
corruption as a Member of the Lebowa Parliament, Sekgopela built
a substantial support base amongst grass-roots leaders (like
Willis Ngobe).
When Matsiketsane returned from banishment, he was welcomed by
a group of migrants representing a migrant organisation. The
organisation was made up of Pulana nationalists and was to be a
further source of support for Mashile.
Matsiketsane and the Land Question: The Leihlo La Naqa Migrant
Organisation
In 1978 a meeting of Pulana migrant workers was held at the
municipal compound in Crown Mines Johannesburg. Migrants were
mobilised through sending invitations to burial societies,
compounds and factories. The vast majority of the migrants who
attended the meeting worked for either the railways,
municipality, mines or manufacturing concerns. Most of the
workers were illiterate, reflecting the relatively late arrival
of schools in Mapulaneng. Urban representatives of the Tribal
Authorities were also invited to the meeting. The meeting elected
an interim committee for a new organisation, Leihlo la Naga, The
Eye of the Nation."
The major concerns of the Tha Ey« of the Nation's founders were
the "land question" and the position of Mapulaneng in Lebowa. On
the one hand, "Pulana land" was being progressively "lost" to
Gazankulu, on the other, the Pulana were being excluded from
jobs and resources provided by the Lebowa Government. As a means
of tackling the problem, the founders hoped to create a
structure to unify the disparate Pulana chiefs under the umbrella
of their common ethnicity. As a means to achieve this unity, the
migrants wanted to have one Pulana representative in each
township, instead of the existing system where each of the eight
chiefs had an "induna". The aims of the organisation were
reflected in its motto: "Mapulana first"."
The migrant's had, however, entered ethnic politics under duress.
In contrast to the motto, the first aim and objective of the
organisation was the:
"elimination of discrimination on the ground of race,
tribe, religion, language and sex; and instead create
conditions in which equality of opportunity can be
exercised.""
In short, the migrant organisation aimed to abolish Apartheid.
This opposition to Apartheid was built on the migrant's ethnic
identity. Prior to the implementation of Tribal Authorities,
Pulana ethnicity had existed, but the relationship between that
ethnicity and politics was diffuse. Pulana ethnicity was greater
than any single chieftainship. There was no indigenous principle
which linked membership of a chiefdom to a Pulana (or any other)
ethnic identity. As a consequence, and given the Pulana
chiefdom's historical position on the edges of the Pedi, Swazi
and Shangaan polities, the Pulana chiefdoms were characterised
by ethnically heterogenous populations. On the other hand,
according to indigenous principles, ownership and control of
land was the exclusive and sacred right of the chief. A
chieftainship "sacrificed blood for the land", that is it earned
the right to own the land through conquest. However, these
indigenous principles clashed with the ethnic criteria employed
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by the Apartheid state in the allocation of land and the
recognition of chiefs. The implementation of Apartheid saw the
Pulana nationalists "losing" what they believed to be land
belonging to the Pulana chiefdoms. The Pulana nationalists felt
confident that they were best able to assert their ethnic
interests, (particularly in relation to the "land question"),
when the link between ethnicity and access to state power, one
of the cornerstones of Apartheid, was severed.
Yet, the Pulana nationalists had to fight on a terrain where they
were at their weakest; that is they had to organise themselves
as an ethnic group to stake their claim to land and government
resources. A bridge needed to be built between the indigenous
and Apartheid principles. Some structure had to be found to
represent a Pulana nation's claim to land on the basis of
conquest. Unlike the Zulu king, there was no clear Pulana
paramount: there were many Pulana chiefs, none of whom had a
secure historical claim to the paramountcy, but all of whom found
elements in history on which to base the claim. These competing
claims to the paramountcy reflected a history of intra-Pulana
chiefly competition and distrust. The Pulana chiefs did not have
a history of working as a coherent block under a centralised
authority. Finding a representative of the organisation in the
countryside was not going to be an easy task.
The migrants faced further difficulties in their search for a
representative of the Pulana nation. The recognised chiefs
accepted Tribal Authorities out of a political necessity.
However, having accepted a position in the bureaucracy, and the
strictures that went along with that position, the recognised
chiefs had distanced themselves from the indigenous principles
on which the Pulana claim to land was based. Furthermore, these
chiefs were paid by the state to implement policies that denied
those rights that the chieftainship was looked upon by its
subjects to protect.25 The chief was no longer chief because of
the "people" but because of recognition by the state. These
chiefs could not symbolise what it meant to be a "moral Pulana".
The migrants had a vision of the chieftainship as the Pulana
chieftainships existed prior to Tribal Authorities, that is as
political and ritual protector of the integrity of the Kgoro. The
migrants wanted to reestablish a system where the chief did not
receive a salary from government, but survived through the
services he rendered to his subjects. Any problem was to be
solved through "calling his people to Legkotla". In short, "it
was only for a chief to make peace with his tribe"."
The situation was further complicated by the fact that the
migrants had urgent complaints that they hoped to voice about the
functioning of the Tribal Authorities. Although the explicit
aims and objectives had the potential to unite chiefs and
subjects, the implicit aim of the Eya of the Nation was to
provide the migrants with a "voice in the countryside". Not only
were decisions being made at Tribal Authority meetings during the
week in the absence of the migrants, but bribery and embezzlement
were commonplace. School building funds were being embezzled by
both chiefs and principals. More and more taxes were being
imposed on an already over-extended populace. The majority of the
councillors on the Tribal Authorities were businessmen who did
"not feel pity for the poor".27
Not surprisingly, the newly formed migrant organisation was
frustrated in its efforts to obtain recognition from a state
reluctant to recognise any political representative apart from
the chief. At an introductory meeting, the chiefs and the
magistrate in Bushbuckridge refused to accept the credentials of
the executive committee. The organisation found an ally in Chief
Masoja Chiloane (Molotele), the last chief to be granted a
Tribal Authority after being removed from white owned farms in
1972. Molotele's insular existence on Glen Lyden under labour
tenancy conditions, left the chief illiterate, steeped in an
oral tradition, and out of his depth in his new circumstances.2'
The chief was vulnerable and looking for allies. Hints that the
migrant organisation recognised his claim to paramountcy fell on
receptive ears, and Moletele allowed a mass meeting to be held
in his courtyard. However, the tension between the chieftainship
as defined in an oral tradition and the compromises made by
chiefs in accepting Tribal Authorities surfaced. Speakers
complained about the "decision" by Molotele to "sell" the
chieftainships historical land on Glen Lyden by "accepting"
removal and Tribal Authorities. The next (and last) meeting the
migrants held at Molotele was surrounded by machine gun wielding
police.
Undaunted, the migrants held a further meeting at Crown Mines to
elect an "urban areas executive committee". Executive portfolio
holders as well as a representative from each of the nine
townships present were chosen. However, these elections were
designed to maintain the appearance of trusting the recognised
chiefs. A few weeks later, the "real" elections for the "Top
Urban Executive Committee" were held in the absence of any
representative of the recognised chiefs. The meeting was
attended by Sekgopela Mashile, who had recently been elected to
represent Mapulaneng in the Lebowa parliament. Approximately
eighteen members were elected, all of whom were workers. The
Chair, Secretary and Treasurer all worked for the railways. There
were two Apostolic Faith Mission priests on the executive. The
majority of the members had their homes in the Setlare and
Molotele chiefdoms.
Having been shunned by the recognised chiefs, the migrants had
decided to throw in their lot with Matsiketsane. As an
unrecognised "chief" banished for fifteen years for his
opposition to Tribal Authorities, Mashile personified the image
of the chief as protector of the "community". As Mashile's core
support area was allocated to Gazankulu, his claim to the
chieftainship represented the chasm between one of the Pulana
oral histories of the region (and the moral economy of the
chieftainship associated with that tradition) and the state's
ahistorical, ethnically based, principles of land allocation.
Furthermore, Matsiketsane claimed that the Setlare chieftainship
was the paramount over the other Pulana chiefs on the basis of
Maripe's victory over the Swazis in 1864. In a nutshell,
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Matsiketsane Mashile represented the vision of a chieftainship
that ignored the boundaries and principles imposed by the
Apartheid state. The "top executive " committee formed the
"reception committee" to welcome Matsiketsane on his return from
the Transkei in 1978. Mashile was presented with "gifts" and a
feast was arranged at Mashile's house.
Following the feast the goal of uniting all the Pulana chiefs
under the structure of the Eye of the Nation became untenable.
On his return, Mashile reopened the sucession dispute for the
Setlare chieftainship. By welcoming Mashile home, the migrant's
had taken sides in the dispute and closed off the possibility of
working with Setlare. Furthermore, the recognised chiefs were
threatened by Matsiketsane's claim to the paramountcy. The
executive members of the organisation recalled: "The chiefs of
Mapulaneng decided that LLN had chosen Matsiketsane to be the
paramount chief of Mapulaneng. After this event all the chiefs
ignored us.""
A few months after Matsiketsane's return the Mapulaneng branch
of the LLN was formed. The branch united grass-roots leaders who
were disenchanted with the bureaucracy with supporters of
Matsiketsane's chiefly aspirations. The President of the branch,
a priest, was a close relative of Mashiles. The General Secretary
was a school principal. The Treasurer was a recently retired
migrant who was renting and managing a shop. All three officer
bearers lived in the Setlare Tribal Authority.30
Matsiketsane Builds His Chieftainship
To prove his personal power, a chief must prove his ability to
intervene in the sphere of the supernatural. Matsiketsane
returned to Bushbuckridge as a Bishop in the Bantu Apostolic
Faith Mission church. He soon formed a congregation and opened
up sub-branches of the church. Matsiketsane proved the "power of
his words" by acting as a faith-healer in the church. In time,
his brother, Sekgopela, and nephew, Benson, became priests in the
church and held services at their houses. Former Pulana headmen
in Gazankulu who supported Mashile's claim to the Setlare
chieftainship, also started congregations.11
The two brothers reconstituted structures of the chieftainship,
in particular the Bagomane (the chief's family council), in the
form of the Kwanang Mashile burial society. Although the society
was originally only meant to service members of the Mashile
family, the demand was such that the organisation expanded beyond
those confines. By 1986 the society had seven branches with a
total membership of over five hundred households. Matsiketsane
was the president of the society. Sekgopela was his deputy. There
was a large overlap of the priests in Mashile's church and branch
heads of the society. The branches were based in both Mapulaneng
and Gazankulu. At the end of each year, the society held a feast
at Matsiketsane's house consisting of speeches, songs, dances and
food.
Implicit in the notion of a burial society was the constitution
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of a community based on the principle of mahloko, "sharing the
pain". By taking the burden of the death off the family's
shoulders, the society was making the "community a family" and
the "family a community"." The feast the followed the burial
represented a symbolic display of trust and unity. Trust because
residents were willing to eat the food offered at the feast and
unity because no-one was socially above eating the offered food.
Apart from providing himself with a public platform to
communicate relevant political messages, by placing himself at
the intersection of the living and the dead, Mashile was putting
himself in a position to interpret the legacy of the ancestors.
Matsiketsane and the Lebowa Parliament
The two Mashile brothers, with the support of Leihlo La Naga, won
the 1983 elections to become members of the Lebowa parliament.
The Mashiles' main opponent was a close friend of the Chief
Minister of Lebowa, a businessman and the only Pulana resident
in Mapulaneng with a university degree. Mashile's victory
represented the triumph of indigenous symbols over symbols of
status and power associated with western literate culture. To the
Pulana nationalists, victory meant that even though the state
refused to recognise Mashile's credentials, this did not mean
that the "people" did not recognise his leadership.
As a Member of the Lebowa Parliament, Mashile was able to have
his cake and eat it. He was able to represent the "community" to
the Lebowa Government (a job otherwise monopolised by the Tribal
Authorities) without (unlike the recognised chiefs) becoming
implicated in the administration of unpopular policies. Mashile
became an even greater threat to the recognised chiefs: Implicit
in each approach made to Mashile for assistance and advice was
an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of his claim to the
chieftainship. Mashile became a broker: he either took residents
directly to the bureaucracy or brought the bureaucracy to meet
the residents without being associated with the failures of the
state.
The Mashiles fought against regionalism and nepotism in the
Lebowa government that had the effect of discriminating against
Pulanas. An alleged Pedi stereotype of Pulanas was that they were
"stupid" and "primitive" because relatively few Pulanas were
educated compared to the Pedi who had a long history of mission
schools. The following quote illustrates how this attitude was
experienced:
At home we spoke Pulana, but at school, where most of the
teachers' were from Pietersburg, we had to speak Northern
Sotho. People from Pietersburg were saying that we are
speaking like kids... At one stage, Matsiketsane wanted to
break from Lebowa, because of the way those people were
behaving towards the Pulanas."
The Mashiles fought for, and succeeded in, placing Pulanas in
jobs in the bureaucracy that were previously "reserved' for
"Pedis from Seshego". The instatement of the first Pulana school
principal in 1984 was iled as a victory for the Pulana against
"Pedi" chauvinism. In the processes of securing jobs for
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professionals in the bureaucracy, Mashile won the support of
numerous principals and teachers who became members of the
LLN.34
The Mashiles also struggled for infrastructural resources from
Lebowa. These struggles included the provision of schools, water
supply and electricity. Amongst the Pulana nationalists the
construction of a teacher's training college was both an economic
and ethnic political project; a teachers training college would
not only secure jobs for Pulanas in the bureaucracy, but also
contradict the stereotype of Pulanas as "primitive". Mashile
organised for the Minister of Education to attend a meeting with
"parents" at a school hall in Mapulaneng. The meeting was
attended by over a thousand people. The Minister agreed to
establish a temporary college of education at Lekete school the
following year while a permanent structure was under
construction.
The Mashiles' achievements in making bureaucrats accountable for
their actions were impressive. In the seventies, the provision
of any bureaucratic service, including the provision of water,
electricity and land, lay at the discretion of the Tribal
Authority. To alienate the Tribal Authority meant losing access
to the entire bureaucracy. Mashile was able to bypass the Tribal
Authorities in ensuring that residents' rights were respected.
This gave residents the opportunity to challenge the Tribal
Authorities without fearing devastating repercussions. Mashile
had agricultural officers, policemen, clerks and a magistrate
"transferred" for corruption. To his constituency, Mashile was
able to use his position to present himself as a chief who
represented the "people" to the authorities, but not vice versa.
These activities made Matsiketsane a symbol of resistance and a
source of political authority that went beyond his position as
MP. The two brothers did not limit their activities to
disciplining the bureaucracy. They successfully challenged the
implementation of certain Betterment policies, such as the
banning of the use of river beds for farming purposes. They
fought the Lebowa policy of arresting and fining migrants for not
paying their taxes when they came home at the end of each year.
Sekgopela Mashile specialised in assisting residents with work-
based problems. The Mashiles were called in by families to
mediate in marital problems and disputes between neighbours.35
The executive of Leihlo La Naga summed up Mashile's ambiguous
status: "Every time we didn't want to see a chief because we had
an MP in the Lebowa Government. "34 To the £y« of th« Nation at
least, Mashile had become the Paramount chief of Mapulaneng.
Leihlo La Naga and the Ethnic Conflict
The Pulana Nationalists' opposition to Apartheid did not mean
that they were above local ethnic antagonisms. Leihlo La Naga
began to explore alternative political strategies to improve the
position of Pulanas, specifically in relation to the state. Read
through the prism of Maripe's relative subjugation to the Pedi
Paramount, the Lebowa Government was perceived by the
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organisation as a new form of "Pedi" dominance. Lebowa tax was
represented as the Pedi taking money from the Pulana.35 The
organisation looked into the possibility of Mapulaneng becoming
a separate homeland so as to fall directly under central
government. Towards this end, Leihlo La Naga tried to forge an
alliance with the "Khutswe" and the "Pai", based on their common
understanding of the relationship between ethnicity and politics
and their mutual marginalisation by the recognised "tribes",
those being the "Pedis, Shanganese and Swazis".36
Conflicts with the Lebowa Government were overshadowed by the
release of the Consolidation Commission in mid 1984 which
redefined the borders between Mapulaneng and Mhala. The
application of the same indigenous principles that conflicted
with Apartheid principles also lay behind the Pulana antagonism
against "Shangaans". As far as the Pulana Nationalists were
concerned, the "Shangaans", fleeing the wars in Mozambique, had
been given sanctuary and land by the Pulana chiefs. In accepting
land, the "Shangaans" were regarded as having accepted their
subjugation to the Pulana chiefs. When the "Shangaan" chiefs were
given "Pulana" land and recognition from the state, the Pulana
nationalists saw this as a betrayal of their historical
agreement."
The Commission proved to be the spark that resulted in the ethnic
war of October 1984. Leihlo La Naga, with the Mashile brothers
as Members of Parliament, organised the Pulana side of the
conflict.38 Although the immediate nature of the conflict
created an unprecedented degree of unity between the urban branch
of Leihlo La Naga, the Mapulaneng branch, the Mashile brothers,
and the Molotele chieftainship (who were the most effected by the
border changes) this unity began to break down shortly after the
conflict.
Funds raised for legal services were allegedly embezzled by
Molotele resulting in a rift between the chief and Matsiketsane.
This rift soon took the form of chiefly conflict. Molotele,
Matsketsane asserted, was living on land belonging to the Setlare
chieftainship and should move back to Glen Lyden to live on his
"own" land." The Molotele chief's insecurity regarding his
recognition by the state served to make the conflict more
intense.
A split emerged between the Mapulaneng branch and the urban
leadership of Leihlo La Naga over the control of funds. Following
the split, the Soweto branch began to approach opposition members
of (the central) parliament, rural service organisations, and the
Minister of Constitutional Development around the possibility of
Mapulaneng withdrawing from Lebowa and falling under central
government. They had little success in these endeavours.40
In 1985, two African National Congress guerillas were killed, and
one guerilla was shot and captured in Mapulaneng. The general
secretary of the Mapulaneng branch of Leihlo La Naga was arrested
and charged with assisting a banned organisation. He was found
guilty and was to become the principal of the Robben Island
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prisoners' school during his imprisonment. Two other members of
the Leihlo La Naga executive were interrogated and tortured by
the police. These events highlight an overlap between the aims
of Leihlo La Naga and that of the national liberation movement.
It is towards Matsiketsane's alliance with organisations with a
distinctly national agenda that the paper now turns.
Matsiketsane and the Congress Alliance
In 1986 Matsiketsane forged an alliance with the residents of
Shatale that was independent of his claims to the chieftainship.
Shatale, which was to become the headquarters of the secular
Pulana, was an extraordinary place when compared with the
surrounding trust farms. A portion of London farm was
demarcated, named Shatale and declared a township in 1962. This
meant that taps were provided on every street and residents were
forbidden from keeping stock. No agricultural land was provided.
The Native Commissioner, Charles Bourquin, modelled the township
on urban townships and pressured the Department of Housing to
build corrugated iron houses. The houses were built, made
available for rent and, much to Bourquin's chagrin, were
boycotted by the local populace. The chief state ethnologist, Van
Warmelo, was called in. Van Warmelo diagnosed the boycott as
having been caused by chiefly competition for followers and
prescribed the construction of a township in all Tribal Authority
areas. Bourquin knew better, and eventually relented by allowing
residents to build their own houses without having to pay a
monthly rental. A high-school was built in the township to
encourage "professionals" to settle in Shatale."
"Surplus" residents from townships around Graskop, Pilgrims Rest
and Sabie were removed to Shatale." Households from the
surrounding trust farms with an interest in providing their
children with a Secondary education moved to the township. Over
time, the township became the home of teachers, other
professionals and businesspeople. Relatively few households in
Shatale depend on migrant labour." In 1984, half the High
schools (which offered matric) in Mapulaneng were located in
Shatale.
The township was governed by a town council. Although the powers
of the council were negligable, residents had few complaints.
Rentals remained relatively low, and conditions in the township
were noticably better than surrounding areas. Every household was
provided with taps, electricity was installed in the mid
eighties, and the main road was tarred in 1986.
In 1984, the Mashile brothers called a parliamentary report back
meeting in Shatale. The meeting was attended by approximately two
thousand people. Although problems around civic issues were
raised, the most pressing and vocal problem was that of
policing." Residents were enraged by the poor police
performance in solving thirteen murders that had occurred in the
township during the previous year. Most of the murders had
involved the mutilation of the victim's bodies. The genitals,
tongue and eyes had been severed from the corpses. Suspects had
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been arrested for the crimes, but had been released without being
charged. The Mashiles raised the problem in the Lebowa
parliament,4* but the situation did not improve. The following
year, five more people were killed, including two children.
Evidence around the murders pointed to a group of seven people
lead by a businessman (who was also the township mayor), Mr
Morema. The motivation for the crimes was to make "muti" so that
the gang's businesses would thrive. Residents believed that they
had not been arrested because of a close relationship between the
leader of the gang and the police station commander at
Bushbuckridge. In November 1985, the Mashile brothers organised
a meeting between township residents and the Minister of Law and
Order in Lebowa. At the meeting, the Minister agreed to have the
Station Commander transferred along with his senior officers.
In December 1985, the group of seven people were arrested after
various human body parts were allegedly found in Morema's
refrigerator. However, the group was released without being
charged. Tension in the township heightened as a new restaurant
complex owned by Morema was shortly to be opened. Residents asked
themselves who was going to be "sacrificed" to "baptise" the new
store.
It is impossible to describe the atmosphere of terror that
pervades a neighbourhood when there is a muti-murderer on the
loose. Few images evoke as much horror, anger and fear as that
of a brutally murdered and mutilated corpse. No-one can feel
safe as the choice of target is arbitrary. The absence of street-
lights make travel by foot at night, a regular necessity for most
residents, a dread-filled experience. Anxiety in Shatale reached
a fever-pitch.
Apart from the fear that the muti-murder provoked, the killings
also generated a moral-panic." The failure by the police to act
effectively against the murderers caused residents to question
the very fibre of the state itself. The gulf between residents
and the bureaucracy increased. As "the sore aches the owner","
that is those effected by a problem experience the consequences
of the problem, a group of residents decided to take action. A
pamphlet was produced, ordering members of the alleged gang to
leave or face being forced out of the township. A group of six
students organised a series of secret meetings in the classrooms
of five Secondary Schools in Shatale. On the evening of the 23
February the students from all the schools assembled on the local
soccer ground and went on to burn the houses of two members of
the gang. Three days later, a mob of students confronted the
alleged leader of the gang, Morema, at his bottlestore. Morema
drew a gun, an altercation ensued during which Morema was killed
and his bottle-store burnt down. The students went on to burn the
houses of the remaining members of the gang."
That evening the Lebowa riot squad from Seshego arrived in the
township. They arrested every student they could find, all the
members of the local football club and two teachers. The police,
assisted by members of Morema's family, systemically assaulted
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all the arrested people. Those students who had not been arrested
fled into the nearby mountains. School attendance dropped to a
negligible level.
The Mashile brothers obtained permission from the Minister of Law
and Order in Lebowa to hold a mass meeting in Shatale with the
aim of persuading the students to go back to school. The arrested
students were released on March 14. Two days later, the meeting
was convened. At the meeting, the Mapulaneng Crisis Committee was
elected to negotiate with the police and other relevant
authorities.
Mobilisation to Organisation: The Kapulanang Criaia Coamittaa
The social composition of the Committee reflected Shatale's
specific history. All the members, except for the women's
organiser, had at one time or another been teachers. The ages of
the members of the Committee ranged between twenty six and thirty
six.49 The Pulana nationalist claim to political hegemony over
the district did not make sense to members of the Crisis
Committee who had experienced life under "Shangaan" chiefs and
whose world-view was essentially national. The following life
history of the President of the Committee demonstrates these
themes:
Lawrence Mogakane was born in Orinoco in 1959, the fifth of
a family of eight children. His father was a migrant
worker, employed as a waiter in a hotel in Germiston. The
majority of the Mogakane's neighbours, and childhood
friends were "Shangaans". Local boys formed gangs to
protect one another from boys from the (predominantly
Pulana) Shatale. Any neighbourly disputes were taken to
Kheto Nxumalo, the Shangaan chief's court. Lawrence went to
primary school in 1966. Six years later, he went to an
ethnically mixed initiation school whose prinicipal was
Hlanganu. In 1973, after suffering constant harrassment
from Nxumalo's induna following the establishment of
Gazankulu, the Mogakane's moved to Shatale "because of the
proximity of schools". At high school, Mogakane formed a
study group with three other students who were later to
become members of the Crisis Committee. Although Mogakane
had been brought up with the idea that Pulanas were the
"owners of the land", any resonances that the notion had
were removed when, in 1979, Mogakane read for a Bachelor of
Commerce degree at the University of the North, and was
exposed to student political organisation and national
leaders of. During one of his vacations, Mogakane got a job
at Sabie paper mills and proceeded to organise the factory
under the Paper, Printing and Allied Workers Union. After
three years of studying, Mogakane was forced to leave the
university without qualifying for financial reasons. On
his return to Bushbuckridge, he began employment with a
Bank.so
The MCC saw itself as part of a national movement and made
almost immediate contact with national organisations. These
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included the South African Council of Churches, the Detainees
Parent's Support Committee, the National Education Crisis
Committee and the United Democratic Front. Members of the
Committee attended workshops and conferences called by the above
organisations. The Committee adopted the liberation strategy
advocated by the UDF, which centred around the creation of mass
based organisations. The Mashile brothers' role in facilitating
meetings and contact with the bureaucracy was vital in achieving
this goal, which created the basis of a working alliance between
the Committee and the brothers.51
Soon after the Crisis Committee was formed, students in Shatale
formed the Shatale Youth Congress (SYC). The Youth Congress
consisted of a Central Executive Committee, a Cultural Committee,
and Educational Committee and a Disciplinary Committee. Most of
the leading members of the Congress had experienced political
organisation whilst attending school in townships on the Rand.
The President of the Congress was schooling in Shatale because
he was wanted by the police in Daveyton because of his political
activities. Like the MCC, the SYC made almost immediate contact
with national organisations."
The aims of the Shatale Youth Congress identified unambiguously
with a national political agenda. The first aim was to "draw [up]
a good guideline for a future community system in a democratic
South Africa."" The other aims and objectives included building
unity amongst residents, improving education, providing
entertainment and maintaining law and order. The latter aim was
to dominate the activities of the Youth Congress. The families
of the alleged muti-murder gang had become vigilantes, working
with the consent of the police. The vigilantes harassed Shatale
residents and threatened to poison the water supply. The SYC
formed itself into anti-crime squads who patrolled the location
throughout the night. When a bakery was robbed, residents
approached the SYC who caught the thieves. The SYC also formed
a "people's court" modelled on the chief's court. The court was
used to discipline members of the SYC, intervene in neighbourly
conflicts and try cases of youths in neighbouring communities who
abused the aims of the "struggle".54
The MCC and the SYC maintained a close working relationship. The
leadership of both organisations consulted with one another
before embarking on any action. The SYC provided the person power
to publicise MCC campaigns. The two organisations set up Student
Representative Councils in Shatale. When a woman was kidnapped
by a gang based in Mhala, members of the MCC and the SYC, rescued
the girl, destroyed the gang's business, and handed the gang over
to the police.
The MCC aimed to "organise the region" and went about forming
sub-branches, which in the process, resulted in a working
relationship with the Mashile brothers. On the 13 April, the
Mashiles held a parliamentary "report back" meeting at Green-
Valley. After residents had registered their complaints, the MCC
organised an election for the Setlare sub-branch of the Crisis
Committee. Youths from Shatale also informed youths at the
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meeting to form an organisation.
With the election of the Setlare Crisis Committee, the Crisis
Committee as an organisation became associated with
Matsiketsane's chiefly and ethnic agenda. The three active
members of the SCC were the Chair, a telephone exchange operator
(who had passed his matric exams); the Vice President: a
shoemaker whose schooling ended at Standard One; and the
Treasurer: a shopowner who had also left school after Standard
One." The Chair was secretary of the Mapulaneng branch of
Leihlo La Naga and the Treasurer had the matching portfolio in
the local branch of the migrant organisation. The Vice President
was Matsiketsane's nephew, who was an executive member of Leihlo
La Naga, the next in line for Matsiketsane's "throne" and who was
resident in Gazankulu. In other words, the Setlare Crisis
Committee did not recognise the borders between Lebowa and
Gazankulu but defined Mapulaneng along the lines advocated by
Leihlo La Naga. In the areas outside of Shatale, the Crisis
Committee, youth organisation, and the rhetoric of national
liberation that came along with it, became drawn into one side
of a secession dispute and the ethnic conflict. Assertions by the
recognised chief that the Setlare Crisis Committee was another
attempt by Matsiketsane to replace him, were on the face of it,
consistent with the unfolding of events. Furthermore, given the
association between Pulana ethnicity and the emergence of
national liberation organisations in the district, no
organisations with a national political agenda found a foothold
in Mhala until 1990.
The MCC was caught in another contradiction. On the one hand, it
had constituted itself as a crisis committee, whose main function
was to calm an extremely explosive situation. On the other hand,
the MCC perceived itself as being part of a national liberation
movement. They organised the May 1 stayaway and attempted to
implement the resolutions taken at the National Education Crisis
Committee's national conference. They popularised a culture of
national liberation introducing t-shirts, stickers and newspapers
with an african national slant to Mapulaneng." The problem for
the Crisis Committee lay, however, in the way the rhetoric of the
liberation movement was understood by the youth. The African
National Congress declared 1985 the year of the youth and hailed
the youth as the vanguard of the struggle for national
liberation. These calls fell on receptive ears in the
countryside. The rural youth, historically and culturally
excluded from having a political voice, were given the authority
to lead the nation. Youth organisation spread like wildfire
throughout the district. However, there was a huge gap in the way
the MCC and the SYC understood the "struggle" and the role of
youth organisation, and the way that the youth living under the
Tribal Authorities perceived problems faced by their
"communities". In the months of April and May 1986, approximately
one hundred and fifty people were attacked as witches. Youth
organisations linked by rhetoric to the Congress Alliance became
enmeshed in local struggles and divisions. These associations
between the "struggle", the authority to act and local conflicts
can be read off the following song sung by the Brooklyn Youth
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Organisation as they patrolled the location at night:
Our lives are in great danger.
We are bewitched.
We are poisoned.
Abortions are the order of the day.
Comrades, wake up, remake the world.
Our parent's hour has passed away.
This hour belongs to the youth.
We the Comrades.
Forward Comrades.
We are a generation of war.
During this period the MCC and SYC were called upon to intervene
in a number of incidents to prevent the anti-witchcraft attacks
from taking place. They were almost always successful on these
occasions. However, in the majority of cases the MCC and SYC were
unaware of, and had no control over, the attacks. It was only the
invasion of the area by a large contingent of South African
Defence Force soldiers that brought the situation under control.
At the same time, the executive members of the MCC, the Mashile
brothers and the active members of the SCC were detained and
visible political organisation in the district ground to a halt.
Matsiketsane spent six months in jail before being released on
bail. Charged first with sedition and then with terrorism,
Mashile and the Crisis Committee were acquitted at their trial
in mid 1997. However, in order to understand the context
Matsiketsane inherited on his release from prison, it is
necessary to take a detour into the nature and significance of
youth organisation. This will be achieved in the following
chapter that explores the moral economy of youth organisations,
particularly as it related to chiefly politics and gender and
generational relationships. The final chapter takes up the story
of Matsiketsane again, by analysing the Sofasonke Civic Union,
an alliance that was formed in opposition to the Mashile brothers
and youth organisation.
Nevertheless, it will not be out of place to conclude this paper
by posing the question: Was Matsiketsane primarily a Pulana
nationalist, or an african nationalist. The obvious answer is
that Matsiketsane was both: He found Apartheid repugnant as both
a Pulana and a black South African. But Pulana nationalism was
not entirely compatible with African nationalism, and, in the
last instance Matsiketsane was married to his claim to the
chieftainship, and the imaginary on which that claim was built:
It was through them (the "Shangaans] that I was arrested.
They wanted to rule me, whereas they are the refugees from
Portuguese East Africa... When Bourquin came in 1934, he
appointed Shangaan headmen as chiefs ruling their own
people. But I was not affected by that as they were not
ruling us. Until 1962, when they confiscated all the land
and handed it over to the Shangaans. Then they said I must
be an Inunda under a Shangaan chief... I said, that will be
the day. When they see Pulana all over support me, they
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organised a deportation order... We suffered alot. My
cattle, goats, house destroyed by Bourquin and the
Shangaans. That is why, although the ANC pleads with me to
forget all, I find it difficult not to speak.
Conclusion
This paper has tried to tease out the relationship between Pulana
ethnicity and politics as that relationship played itself out in
the career of Matsiketsane Mashile. Although there were large
areas of overlap between a secular Pulana identity and the Pulana
nationalists, the political agendas of the two organisations
representing these approaches were not entirely compatible. The
close working relationship between Matsiketsane Mashile and the
MCC, and the continuities between the LLN and the SCC ensured
that organisations linked to, and the rhetoric associated with
the national liberation struggle, were perceived as part and
parcel of chiefly disputes and particular ethnic interests.
Consequently, national political organisation did not make in-
roads into Gazankulu until 1990. Matsiketsane's historical
association with the ANC, plus his relationship with the MCC,
resulted in his reputation amongst the recognised chiefs as the
ultimate leader of the youth. Youth politics was thus drawn into
chiefly secession disputes. Nevertheless, youth organisations
also fell at the intersection of gender and generational
relations, and thus had its own specific history, and political
agenda. This forms the subject of the following chapter.
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